Floyd Harmer, Stanley D. Roberts, G. Marion Hinckley, As The Board Of County Commissioners For Utah County, And As The County Board Of Equalization, And As Individual Taxpayers In Ut.A.H County; Harrison Conover, As Utah County Assessor; Elwood L. Sundberg, As Utah County Auditor; Maurice C. Bird, As Utah County Treasurer; C. Steven Hiatch, As A Resident Of And Taxpayer In Utah County v. State Tax Commission : Reply Brief of  Respondent State Tax Commission by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
Floyd Harmer, Stanley D. Roberts, G. Marion
Hinckley, As The Board Of County
Commissioners For Utah County, And As The
County Board Of Equalization, And As Individual
Taxpayers In Ut.A.H County; Harrison Conover,
As Utah County Assessor; Elwood L. Sundberg, As
Utah County Auditor; Maurice C. Bird, As Utah
County Treasurer; C. Steven Hiatch, As A Resident
Of And Taxpayer In Utah County v. State Tax
Commission : Reply Brief of Respondent State Tax
CommissionFollow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Vernon B. Romney and M. Reed Hunter; Attorneys for
Respondent
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Harmer v. State Tax Comm'n, No. 11369 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4414
N THE SUPREME COLtJt::-}· 
F THE ST A TE OF ,:u:j. 
' ,, ,t° 1;/,. 
DAYLE JEFFS 
· •. ounty Attorney 
.,tlOBER T BULLOCK. 
· Special County Attorney 
YD L. PARK 
beputy County Attorney 
43 East 200 North, Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintif11 
--
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS _____________ ------------------------------------------------------ 1 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·----- 2 
POINT I. -
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH IS A 
CONSTITUTIONAL BODY, CHARGED GENERAL-
LY WITH THE ADMINISTRATION AND EN-
FORCEMENT OF TAXATION LAWS IN THIS 
STATE, AND SPECIFICALLY GIVEN THE RE-
SPONSIBILITY OF SUPERVISING LOCAL TAX 
OFFICIALS AND EQUALIZING ASSESSMENTS 
BOTH AMONG AND WITHIN THE SEVERAL 
COUNTIES TO INSURE EQUALITY AND UNI-
FORMITY THROUGHOUT THE STATE.___________________________ 2 
POINT II. -
ONLY THROUGH SUPERVISION OF LOCAL TAX-
ING OFFICIALS BY THE STATE TAX COMMIS-
SION, AND THE EXERCISE BY THE COMMIS-
SION OF BROAD CORRECTIVE POWERS, CAN 
EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE TAX ADMINISTRA-
TION THROUGHOUT THE STATE BE ASSURED, 
AND THOSE SECTIONS OF UTAH CONSTITU-
TIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW WHICH PRO-
VIDE THEREFORE ARE CONSISTENT WITH 
LOGIC, EQUITY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST............ 13 
POINT III. -
TH R 0 UGH 0 UT THIS CONTROVERSY, THE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION ACTED IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH CONTROLLING LAW IN DISCHARGE 
OF ITS SUPERVISORY AND EQUALIZATION RE-
SPONSIBILITIES, BUT THE PURPORTED AD-
JUSTMENTS MADE BY THE COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION ARE IN PART INVALID BE-
CAUSE OF PROCEDURAL ERROR..................................... 18 
POINT IV. -
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
THAT THE AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATION 
SYSTEM DEVISED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE 
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION WAS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND VALUATIONS AR-
RIVED AT BY USE OF THIS SYSTEM VOID. THE 
COURT SHOULD HAVE FURTHER RULED THAT 
THE BOARD GENERALLY ABANDONED IN ITS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued) 
DELIBERATIONS THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARDS OF UNIFORM AND EQUAL ASSESS-
MENT, AND ASSESSMENT BASED ON FAIR 
MARKET VALUE, AND THAT THESE STAND-
ARDS ARE BINDING UPON COUNTY AND STATE 
TAX OFFICIALS IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR 
Page 
VARIOUS DUTIES -------------------------------------------------------------------- 28 
POINT V. -
THE SOLUTION PROPOSED BY APPELLANTS 
DOES NOT SOLVE, NOR DOES THE OFFERED 
DISPOSITION DISPOSE OF, THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PROBLEM OF ASSESSMENT INEQUALITY, AND 
SHOULD BE REJECTED IN FAVOR OF A BROAD-
ER, MORE REASONABLE RESOLUTION WHICH 
IS CONSISTENT WITH CONTROLLING LAW AND 
WHICH WOULD LAY THE BASIC PROBLEM TO 
REST BY WORKING EQUITY THROUGHOUT THE 
STATE -------------------·-----------------------·-------------------------------·---·------·----- 46 
CONCLUSION -------------·-------------------------------------------------··---··-----------·---- 48 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
Atlantic & N.C.R. Co. v. Cataret County Comrn'rs, 
75 N.C. 474 (1876) ·-------------------------------------·------·-----·--·--·------------ 31 
Bank of Carthage v. Thomas, 330 Mo. 19, 
48 S. W.2d 930 ( 1932)--------------------··---------------------------·-·-------·---------- 10 
Board of County Comm'rs of Canadian County v. State 
Board of Equalization, 363 P.2d 242 (Okla. 1964)________________ 33 
Boyne v. State, 80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 255 (1964)____________________________ 33 
Cary v. Reben, 88 Ill. 154, 30 Am. Rep. 543 (1878). _______________________ 32-33 
Chicago R.I. & P.R.Co. v. Monaghan, 54 S.C. 432, 
223 N.W. 344 (1929) .. -----------·------------------------------------------------·-----·- 33 
County Board of Equalization of Kane County v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 88 Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418 (1935)________________________________ 10 
Custer County v. St. Louis S.F. Ry. Co., 207 P.2d 774 
(Okla., 1949) ------------·-·-··--·-----------···--·--·--·----·-----------·---·-·----·---------- 33 
Daly v. Morgan, 60 Md. 460, 16 At!. 287, 1 L.R.A. 757 (1888) ____ 34 
Dickinson v. Porter, 35 N.W.2d 66 (Okla. 1948) ___ --------------------- __ 34 
TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued) 
Page 
Fruitgrowers Express Co. v. Brett, 94 Mont. 281, 
22 P.2d 171 (1933) ·-----------------········-·-·········-··········-···············-···-·· 31 
Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 65 S.D. 173, 
272 N.W. 787 (1937) .. ···-········-·-····················-···········-·······-··········· 33-34 
Griswold v. O'Brien, 89 Mo. 631, 1 S.W. 763 (1886) ············--·--··· 33 
Hamilton v. Fort Wayne, 40 Ind. 491 ( 1872) ··········-·············-···------34 
Hawkins v. Mangam, 78 Miss. 97, 28 So. 872 (1900).................... 31 
Kerr v. Woolley, 3 Utah 456, 24 Pac. 831 (1866) ··----·······---············ 18 
Leicht v. Burlington, 73 Iowa 29, 32 N.W. 494 (1887)................ 34 
Lively v. Missouri K. & T.R. Co., 102 Tex. 545, 
120 S.W. 852 (1909)........................................................................ 31 
Mahoney v. City of San Diego, 245 Pac. 189 (Cal. 1926)............ 31 
Monaghan v. Lewis, 5 Pa. 218, 29 Atl. 948, 
10 Ann. Cases 1048 (1905) .......................................................... 32 
New Jersey Zinc v. Sussex County Board of Equalization, 
70 N.J.L. 186, 56 Atl. 138 (1903)................................................ 22 
Opinion of Justices, 97 Me. 597, 55 Atl. 827 (1903) ........................ 33 
Real Foot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 
36 S.W. 1041, 34 L.R.A. 725 (1896) ········-··································· 31 
Salt Lake City v. Armstrong, 15 Utah 172, 
49 Pac. 641 (1896) ........................................................................ 7 
Saltonstall v. Board of Review of Cheboygan, 
132 Mich. 196, 93 N.E. 154 (1903).............................................. 33 
Shuck v. Lebanon, 197 Ky. 252, 53 S.W. 655 (1899)........................ 33 
Simmons v. Erickson, 54 S.D. 429, 223 N.W. 324 (1929)................ 33 
Smith v. Americus, 89 Ga. 810, 15 S.E. 752 (1892)........................ 32 
South Spring Range & Cattle Co. v. Board of Equaliza-
tion, 18 N.M. 531, 139 Pac. 159 (1914)...................................... 27 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz. 395, 
377 P.2d 770 ( 1963) -·-······················-············································-· 11, 35 
Sparks v. McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283, 327 P.2d 295 (1958)............ 43 
Slate ex rel Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 
50 Pac. 615 (1897) ··--··········-·-····-········-·······---···-······························· 7, 32 
State ex rel Evans v. McGinnis, 34 Ind. 452, 
Anno. 105 A.L.R. 624 (1936)...................................................... 22 
State ex rel Lyman v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190 Pac. 129 (1920) 34 
Slate Tax Comm'n v. Wakefield, 161 Atl.2d 676 (Md. 1960)........ 33 
Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272, 
12 A.L.R. 552 (1920) ....... --·····································-······················· 32 
TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued) 
Page 
Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 182 At!. 2d 841 (1962). 34 
University Heights, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
12 Utah 2d 196, 364 P.2d 661 (1961).............. ...................... 9-10 
Zanesville v. Richards, 59 Ohio St. 589 ( 1855) ............... .. 33 
Constitutions 
Utah Constitution 
Article X, §3 .................................... ................................ ............ 15 
Article XIII, §2 ........................................................................... 29, 32 
Article XIII, §3 .......................................................................... 29, 32 
Article XIII, §11 3-4,8 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated 
Title 53, ch. 7 ......................................................................... 7 
§59-5-46 ..................................................................................... .4-6, 22, 27 
§59-5-46.1 ·························································································· 46 
§59-5-47 .......................................................... 6, 20-21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 
§59-7-1 .............................................................................. 19-20, 21, 23, 25 
§59-7-13 ...................................................................................... 6-7, 27, 28 
§59-13-3 ···························································································· 9 
Texts and Encylopedias 
11 A.L.R. 1486 (1937) 32 
Cooley, Law of Taxation (1924) 
Vol. 1, §158 .................................................................................... 32 
Vol. 3, §1196 ........................................ ·-··----·-·········-·······-·······-····· 27 
Other Authorities 
Morrill, Denis R., Property Tax Assessment and the Utah 
Constitution - A Taxpayer's Dilemma, Utah Law 
Review, Vol. 1966, No. 2 ................................................................ 18, 47 
Report of the Tax Revision Committee of the State of 
Utah (1929) .................................................................................... 8 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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FLOYD HARMER, STANLEY D. ROB-
ER TS, G. MARION HINCKLEY, as the 
Board of County Commissioners for Utah 
County, and as the County Board of Equali-
zation, and as individual taxpayers in Utah 
County; HARRISON CONOVER, as Utah 
County Assessor; ELWOOD L. SUND-
BERG, as Utah County Auditor; MAU-
RICE C. BIRD as Utah County Treasurer; /\ 
C. STEVEN HATCH, as a resident and 
taxpayer of Utah County, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants and )j, 
Cross-Respondents, 
-vs. -
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant. 
Case 
No. 11369 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appella11ts' factual recitation is excerpted from the 
formal judgment of the lower court, and is thus ipso 
facto immune from any criticism on the grounds that it 
distorts such judgment. As we noted in the initial 
hricf, howenr, it is the belief of respondent State Tax 
1 
Commission that the formal judgment of the court is 
itself distortive, particularly in its omission of numer-
ous relevant facts related to average assessment ]evels, 
the default of county assessors, etc. 
It is distortive in another way as well; the ]o"·cr 
court's opinion, as set forth in a memorandum decision 
(R. 145-153) prepared by the court, was partially in 
favor of plaintiffs and partially in favor of defendant 
(appellants' brief, page 2; respondent's initial brief, 
page 2). But the formal judgment prepared by coun-
sel for appellants does not reflect in a just and balanced 
manner this memorandum decision, but rather empha-
sizes and affectionately expands those parts of the memo-
randum decision most favorable to appellants and deni-
grates, emasculates, and sometimes blithely ignores those 
parts of the same memorandum decision favorable to re-
spondent. 
It is the sincere belief of respondent that the memo-
randum decision itself, and the extensive factual narra-
tive set forth in the perior brief of respondent, more fully 
set forth the salient facts in this controversy, and set 
them forth with a fairer emphasis, than the findings of 
fact quoted in appellants' brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH 
IS A CONSTITUTIONAL BODY, CHARGED 
GENERALLY WITH THE ADMINISTRA-
TION AND ENFORCEMENT OF TAXATION 
LAWS IN THIS STATE, AND SPECIFI-
2 
CALLY GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
SUPERVISING LOCAL TAX OFFICIALS 
AND EQUALIZING ASSESSMENTS BOTH 
AMONG AND WITHIN THE SEVERAL 
COUNTIES TO INSURE EQUALITY AND 
UNIFORMITY THROUGHOUT THE STATE. 
The lower court correctly ruled that the State Tax 
Commission (hereafter referred to as the "Commis-
sion'') has broad supervisory powers over county 
tax officials, including the power to equalize assessments 
within the Yarious counties. Indeed, the constitutional 
and statutory provisions setting forth the powers of the 
Commission and defining its relationship with these local 
officials are unequivocal to the degree that a contrary rul-
ing would have been inconceivable. 
The controlling constitutional provision is set forth 
in the brief of appellants (pp. 9-10) and here restated for 
the convenience of the court: 
There shall be State Tax Commission consisting 
of four members, not more than two of whom shall 
belong to the same political party. The members 
of the Commission shall be appointed by the Gov-
ernor, by and with the consent of the Senate, for 
such terms of office as may be provided by law. 
The State Tax Commission shall administer and 
superrise the tax laws of the State. It shall assess 
mines and public utilities and adjust and equalize 
the valuation and assessment of property among 
the several counties. It shall have such other pow-
ers of original assessment as the Legislature 
may provide. Under such limitations as the Leg-
islature may prescribe, it shall establish systems 
a/ public accounting, review proposed bond issues, 
renisc the tax levies and biidgets of local govern-
3 
mental units, and equalize the assessment and 1,'al-
uation of property within the cnunties. The duties 
imposed upon the State Board of Equalization 
by the Constitution and Laws of this Sta.fe shall 
be performed by the State Tax Commission. 
In each county of this State there shall he a Comi-
ty Board of Equalization co11sisting of the Bonnl 
of County Commissioners of said county. T71e 
County Boa,rds of Equalizalion shall adjust and 
equalize the 1,azuation and assessment of the real 
and personal vroperty within their respectire 
counties, subject to such regulation and control by 
the State Tax Commission as may be prescribed 
by law. The State Tax Commission and the Coun-
ty Boards of Equalization shall each have such 
other powers as may be prescribed by the Leg-is-
lature. (Emphasis supplied.) Utah Const., art. 
XIII, ~ 11. 
Thus, the Constitution specifically and ·without 
equivocation grants the State Tax Commission general 
powers to equalize within the various counties, as well as 
among these counties, and this right is to be exercisN1 
freely, and to be limited only by legislative restriction. 
The implementing legislation 1 does not limit this power 
hut simply further defines it and sets forth procedures 
(usually in terms of broad outlines) through which it is 
to be exercised: 
Section 59-5-46. The powers and duties of the 
state tax commission are as follows: 
(3) To prescribe such rules and regulations as 
1 We feel that the convenience of the court might best be served by a 
complete listing of pertinent statutory provisions, and beg the court's in 
dulgence in this uninterrupted and somewhat lengthy recitation of statuton 
Jaw. 
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it may deem necessary, not in conflict with the 
Constitution and laws of the state, to govern coun-
ty boards and officers in the performance of arny 
duty it& con1iection with assessment, equalization 
and collection of general taxes. 
(9) To have and exercise general supervision 
over the administration of the tax laws of the 
state, o /)Cr assessors and over county boards in 
the performance of their duties as county boards 
of equalization and over other county officers i111 
the performance of their duties in comiection with 
assessment of property and collection of taxes, to 
the end that all assessments of property be ma,de 
just and equal, at true i·alue, and that the tax 
burden may be distributed without favor or dis-
crimination. 
(11) To confer icith, advise and direct county 
treasurers and assessors in matters relating to 
the assessment and equalization of property for 
taxation and the collection of taxes ... 
(14) To direct proceedings, actions and prosecu-
tions to enforce the laws relating to the penalties, 
liabilities and punishments of public officers, per-
sons a1id officers or agents of corporations for 
failure or neglect to comply with the provisions 
of the statutes go1 1erning the return, assessment 
and taxation of property; 
(18) To risit, as a board or by individual mem-
bers thereof, annually, and oftener if deemed ncc-
cessary, each county of the state for the investiga-
tion a11d direction of the il'ork and methods of lo-
cal assessors and other officials in the assessment, 
equalization and taxation of property, and to as-
certain 11'l1ether the provisions of law reqniring 
5 
the assessment of all property, not exernpt from 
tarxation, and the collection of taxes have bee11 
properly administered and enforced. 
(19) To examine carefully into all cases 11,liere 
evasion or violation of the laws for assessment 
aqzd taxation of property is alleged, complained 
of or discovered, and to ascertain wherein exist-
ing laws are defective or are improperly or negli-
gently administered. 
(23) To ... exercise all powers necessary in the 
perf orrnance of its duties. 
Section 59-5-47. The state tax commission shall 
adjust and equalize the valuation of the taxable 
property in the several counties of the state for 
the purpose of taxation; and to that encl it may 
of its own initiative order or make an assessrn.ent 
or reassessrnent of any property which it deems 
to have been overassessed or underassessed or 
which it finds has not been assessed. 
Finally, Section 59-7-13 provides: 
Each year the state tax commission shall conduct 
an investigation throughout each county of the 
state to determine whether all property subject to 
taxation is on the assessment rolls, and whether 
such property is being assessed at thirty per ce11t 
of its reasonable fair cash value. When, after 
any such investigation, it is found that any 
property which is subject to taxation is not 
assessed, then the state tax commission shall di-
rect the county assessor, the county board of 
equalization or the county auditor as it may 
determine to enter the assessment of s11rli 
escaped property. If it is found that an:» 
property in any county is not being assessed 
at thirty percent of its reasonable fair cash 
6 
,·alue, the state tax commission shall, for 
the purpose of equalizing the vRlue of property in 
the state, increase or decrease the assessed valua-
tion of such property in order to enforce the as-
sessment of all property subject to taxation upon 
the basis of thirty per cent of its reasonable fair 
cash value, and shall direct the county assessor, 
the county board of equalization or the county au-
ditor, as it may determine, to correct the assessed 
rnluation of such property in the manner 'which 
the state tax commission shall prescribe. The 
county assessors, county boards of equalization 
and county auditors shall make such increases or 
decreases as may be required by the state tax 
commission to make the assessment of all prop-
erty within the county conform as nearly as may 
be to thirty per cent of the reasonable fair cash 
\'alue. 
(All emphasis supplied.) 
vVe would respectfully urge that all of the statutory 
provisions just quoted are reasonable, proper, within 
tlie constitutional mandate and, as will subsequently ap-
pear, also necessary and desirable. 
Appellants rely on two antiquated cases in their 
coutcntion that the Commission power to supervise 
county officials is limited to equalization among the var-
ious counties and does not extend to equalizing values 
within these counties. Salt Lake City v. Armstrong, 
1 :J Utah 172, 49 Pac. 641 (1896); State ex rel Cunming-
liam v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 615 (1897). This re-
liance is ill adYised, since these cases are no longer good 
law, heing a construction not of the current constitu-
tional language but of constitutional language which was 
7 
discarded by the people of this state in 1930. Article 
XIII, § 11, read as follows prior to 1930: 
Until otherwise provided by law, there shall be a 
State Board of Equalization, consisting of the 
Governor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, Sec-
retary of State and Attorney-General; also, iu 
c•ach county of this State, a county board of 
equalization, consisting of the board of county 
commissioners of said county. The duty of the 
State Board of Equalization shall be to adjust 
and equalize the valuation of the real and per-
sonal property among the several counties of the 
State. The duty of the county board of equaliza-
tion shall be to adjust and equalize the valua-
tion of the real and personal property within their 
respective counties. Each board shall also per-
form such other duties as may be prescribed hy 
law. (Emphasis supplied.) 
As is obvious from a perusal of this and the current 
constitutional language, it was through enactment of 
the current provision that the State Tax Commission 
as no>v structured came into existence. The date 
of its birth was January 1, 1931, and the enabling 
amendment was proposed pursuant to a study made by a 
tax revision commission consisting of S. R. Thurman, 
W. ·w. Armstrong, and R. E. Hammond. The Tax Re-
vision Commission felt that the creation of a full-time 
tax commission would lead to the modernization of anti-
quated tax administrative structures and procedures, and 
would assure equity and uniformity in administration 
amongst all citizens of the state. Report of the Tax 
Revision Commission of the State of Utah (1929). 
The amendment of the constitution amounted to a 
8 
(·oui::ltitutional reversal of the decisions relied upon by a p-
pellauts, and a statement by the electorate of this state 
to the effect that the Commission vrns to have broader 
equalization powers than did the old State Board of 
~qnalization. The cases are thus not only rendered 
meaningless, based as they are on premises no longer 
r<ilid, but specifically repudiated. There is no case in 
Ptah postdating 1930 which can reasonably be construed 
to (le11y or, in any meaningful sense limit, the power of 
the State Tax Commission to equalize assessments with-
in the ·nuious counties as well as among them. 
The one modern (i.e., post 1930) case cited by appel-
lallts is Unii·ersity Ff eights, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n., 
l~ Utah 2d 196, 364 P .2d 661 ( 1961). This case held that 
the State Tax Commission, in determining the corporate 
franchise tax of a corporation pursuant to the alterna-
tive method set forth in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
·~· 39-13-3 (1963), need not use an appropriate multiple 
of the assessed valuation of the property of this cor-
1nratio11 made for ad valorem tax purposes, but may 
make its own independent investigation and judgment as 
to the value of that property. The decision makes cer-
tnin gc•neral references in dicta to the supervisory pow-
ers of the Tax Commission over county assessors and 
states that local assessment is primarily a function of a 
c:onnty assessor, and the legislature obviously intended 
tliat the Tax Commission would not usurp this function 
llH\'C in exceptional circumstances. It does not say that 
the county assessor performs his duties without being re-
::ipousible to the State Tax Commission, but rather states 
prc•C'isely tlie contrary. The case makes no reference 
9 
whatsoever to county boards of equalization. To sug-
gest, as counsel for plaintiff has done, that this case 
stands for the proposition that the Commission cannot 
correct errors made by a county board of equalization 
when it discovers them, or modifies the power granted 
to the Commission in the quoted constitutional and stat-
utory provisions, is indeed a most tortured construr-
tion. 
There is one post 1931 case which does have prece-
dential value, however. In County Board of Equaliza-
tion of Kane County v. State Tax Comni'n of Utah, 88 
Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418 (1935), this honorable court held: 
Since the commission has general supervision 
over the taa; l(JJU)s of the state and over those 
charged with the enforcement of those laws, and 
has the power on appeal to make such correction 
or change in the order of the county board of 
equalization as it may deem proper, it must ner-
essarily follow tha.t it is authorized to cancel, ra-
cate, or change as assessment when, upon a prop-
er showing, it has been determined that the assess-
ment shou1d be so cancelled, vacated, or changed. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
It must indeed necessarily follow. 
An inquiry into case law from other jurisdictions is 
not rewarding because of variation in constitutional lan-
guage. A few cases may have limited value by way of 
analogy. For example, Bank of Carthage v. Thomas, 330 
Mo. 19, 48 S.W.2d 930 (1932), upheld an increase of 
48.33% in personal property valuations made by the 
state board in overruling a county board, and based thiR 
10 
]1() lcling in large part on simple recognition of the state's 
:-;uperior authority. 
ht most jurisdictions, the State Tax Commission, or 
comparable agency under another name, is given 
hroad supervisory and equalization powers not unlike 
those granted our own. For example, the authority of 
the Arizona Commission has been described in this 
manner: 
The State Tax Commission in its capacity as 
State Board of Equalization is invested with the 
duty to equalize the valuations and assessment of 
property through the state. Its power of equali-
zation is practically unlimited. To that end it may 
equalize the assessment of all property between 
persons of the same assessment district, between 
cities and towns in the same county, and between 
different counties of the state and the property 
assessed by the commission in the first instance. 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz. 
395, 377 P.2d 770 (1963). 
Counsel for plaintiffs urges that an adoption of the 
po:-;ition of defendant would lead to an emasculation of 
county boards of equalization. We respectfully suggest 
that this is analagous to claiming that the establishment 
of an effective appellate system deprives trial courts of 
thrir authority and meaning. Respondent supports the 
(·011eept of viable county boards, acting dynamically in 
fnll exercise of their powers. They are in no sense super-
fluous but have a significant role in tax administration. 
1'lic fact that they are supervised by the tax commission 
does not take away their authority but rather insures 
proper exercise of it. The Commission, in turn, has 
11 
checks on its exercise of granted powers m the legisla-
tive and judiciary. If a county board feels that actions 
or orders of the Commission are unlawful or unfair, it 
can (as has happened in the instant case) petition for 
judicial review. 
Typically (in this jurisdiction as ~well as else when•) 
decisions of county boards of equalization acting withill 
the sphere of their authority are left undisturbed. It 
is only in unusual situations, such as in the present prob-
lem, where a county board refuses to implement a law-
ful directive given to it by the tax commission or, also 
as in this case, purportedly acts but acts i1ffalidly due to 
failure to adhere to controlling substantive and proced-
ural law, that the state supervisory taxing authorit)-
takes steps to reverse or correct action of county hoards, 
beyond responding to routine appeals. 
County boards of equalization exercising their ap-
pointed powers are necessary to proper tax administra-
tion in Utah. Equally necessary is a broad supen-isory 
power in the Utah State Tax Commission, specifically in-
cluding the power to review vamation and assessments of 
property within the various counties. We respectfully 
submit that the tax commission does have this power, 
and that it makes no difference whether this power is ex-
ercised in relation to a single piece of property or 700. 
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POINT lI 
ONLY THROUGH SUPERVISION OF LOCAL 
TAXING OFFICIALS BY THE STATE TAX 
COMMISSION, AND THE EXERCISE BY 
THE COl\fI\IISSION OF BROAD CORREC-
TIVE POWERS, CAN EFFICIENT AND 
J~QUITABLE TAX ADMINISTRATION 
THROUGHOUT THE STATE BE ASSURED, 
AND rrHOSE SECTIONS OF UTAH CONSTI-
TUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW WHICH 
PROVIDE THEREFORE ARE CONSISTENT 
-WITH LOGIC, EQUITY AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST. 
Appellants apparently envision the State Tax Com-
mission functioning vis-a-vis county tax officials in a 
luofidy correlative, speak-when-you-are-spoken-to kind of 
rnlc, and regard anything further as unpalatable inter-
ference. In Point I, we have determined that this is not 
the role envisioned by the framers of the Constitution 
nml the duly elected legislators of this state for the Com-
mission, and in this point we will explore several policy 
rPaso11s why the relationship established by these bodies 
to govern interaction of state and county tax officials is 
not onl:r workable but, indeed, the only just and proper 
relationship which might exist. 
There are a number of reasons why this is so. First, it 
i:-s [l ]mndantly clear that county governments do not have, 
aml because of severe manpower and monetary limita-
ticms cannot have, assessor's offices staffed by qualified 
c•xpcrts. This problem exists throughout the country, 
a11d the testimony of Guy Ivins, Harrison Conover and 
Da,"i<l Burton bears eloquent witness to the existence in 
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spades of these problems in this jurisdiction. Only on 
the state level can persons with experience and expertise 
be compensated roughly consistent with their abilities, 
and others trained to arrive at the same degree of exper-
tise and experience. If every county were required to 
"go it alone" without the assistance of these competent 
state employees, which assistance is invariably readily 
extended, the situation would be considerably worse than 
at present. 
One reason this training and expenence proh-
lem is so significant, here as elsewhere, is that assessorB 
are elected, rather than appointed, and anyone at all 
can run for the office. Untrained and inexperienced per-
sonnel cannot help but make errors in their work and 
without a centralized state agency to advise and teach, 
and correct errors when necessa.ry, total chaos would soon 
result. 
Further, and more importantly, only through a cen-
tralized equalization agency exercising considerable pow-
ers can uniformity and equality of assessment throughout 
the state be assured. It is clear that an intrinsic safe-
guard operates with some effectiveness in cases of dis-
criminatory valuation or assessment between taxpayers 
in the same county. If the property of X is valued or 
assessed at a higher percentage of its fair cash value 
than the property of his neighbor Y, X may seek relief 
through the designated administrative process or through 
institution of legal proceedings. If X is sufficiently in-
formed and sufficiently enraged, he will seek such re-
lief. This safeguard, however, is totally inoperative in 
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t 11e case of a systematic undervaluation or underassess-
mt•11t within a county. If everyone's valuations or as-
sessments are kept low or even lowered, no one com-
plains and everyone votes for good old whoever is able 
to take the credit for the bonanza. In this type of sit-
nation, which is far from uncommon (see Point IV, re-
spomlent 's initial brief), the need for a centralized state 
agency with power to assume original jurisdiction to 
right whatever wrongs exist becomes strikingly apparent. 
Where there is a wrong, the law contemplates the exist-
ence of a remedy. 
'l'hese hypothetical considerations become very con-
nete when explored in the frame of reference of a state-
wide levy, such as the uniform school fund provided for 
in Utah Const. art. X ~ 3 and Title 53, Ch. 7, Utah Code 
A1motated. Max H. Kerr, director of the property tax 
division of the Utah State Tax Commission, testified 
(Tr. 155-181) as to the mechanics of how a state-wide 
levy is set and how tax monies flow into a centralized pool 
for subsequent distribution based on need determined 
aecording to specific statutory standards. He testified 
further that there were in fact three levies for educa-
tional purposes: a 16-mill levy for what was designated 
as the basic program, a 12-mill levy for the state-support-
ed leeway program, both of which are set, and the uni-
form school fund levy which varies yearly. In 1967, it 
was 7.3 mills. A county must exact both the 16- and 12-
mill levies to participate in the uniform school fund pro-
g-ram, and in 1967 all counties did. The three combined 
total 33.3 mills, a considerable levy, and since a sub-
Rtantial percentage of ad valorem taxes go into this fund, 
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the reduction of assessments in one county has impact 
in all counties. Suppose, for example, that in County X 
the county board of equalization arbitrarily reduced all 
valuations for assessment purposes by fifty percent. In 
all likelihood, no resident of the county \voulcl we or otlt-
erwi se challenge such a beneficient action. The eo1111ty 
would then make the required levies, taxes would go into 
the uniform school fund, the county would be entitled to 
draw therefrom, and (assuming other counties or most 
other counties attempted proper assessment) the schools 
in County X will receive financial benefits far in excess 
of contributions made by residents thereof, and far in ex-
cess of what they are justly entitled to. 
Since the reduction of assessments in any county, 
therefore, affects taxpayers in other counties by requir-
ing them to pay a disproportionate share of the school 
support monies, assessments can be wrongfully kept low 
with only a nominal loss in revenues availability. It 
follows inevitably that the uniform school fund can only 
be equitably and properly administered if assessment 
levels are roughly uniform throughout the state, and this 
uniformity can be assured only by a state agency with 
broad powers of review and adjustment of county equali-
zation actions. Mr. Kerr, in association with the uniform 
school fund for well over a decade, and a recognized au-
thority in the ar<'a, corroborated these conclusions with 
his expert opinion. 
The same principles are applicable, of course, to all 
other statewide levies as well as the uniform school fund, 
which has been examined in some detail because it is a 
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prototype and because it is at the present time, in terms 
of dollars invoked, easily the most significant state-wide 
kYy. 
Another compelling reason \Yhy state-wide equaliza-
tion is required is that local tax officials are under con-
·"idcrable pressures to keep taxes low because of political 
"t re8s. The framers and amenders of our constitution 
recognized clearly the strengths and weaknesses of local 
tax administrators, which are axiomatic. Their great 
'irtue is that they are close to the people, aware of local 
r•conomic and political changes, often familiar even with 
pnrticular properties, and are, thus, in an especially ap-
propriate position to make equalization adjustments in 
tlir interests of equity and fairness. The negative side 
t:f the coin is that this very closeness subjects them to 
rnricd emotional, social, and political pressures which 
sometimes distort perspective. A central state authority, 
more removed, is less subject to these. Local pressures 
corniistently are in one direction, toward reduction of as-
st>:ssments and taxes. If history teaches us anything, it 
is that the human animal generally does not like to pay 
taxes m1d that a heavy tax burden, and particularly a 
~l1arp increase in tax burden, can lead directly to lost 
elections. These problems were explored in considerable 
rldail in Point IV of the initial brief :filed by respondent. 
These truths are manifest in this jurisdiction as well 
as almost all others. State-assessed property is close to 
il1c statutory standard, locally-assessed property dra-
matically lower. 
17 
This system of intergovernmental administrative 
check and balance was conceived to solve (and works well 
in solving) concrete problems to insure compliance with 
the mandate of this honorable Court to the effect that it 
is "self-evident" that "no tax is legal" which is not 
''equally and impartially laid on the taxpayer'' and 
"honest and responsible in its administration" and se-
cures "these conditions to the taxpayer in particular 
and to the public in general." Kerr v. Woolley, 3 Utah 
456, 24 Pac. 831 ( 1866). 
The problems above described are not creations of 
the plaintiffs; rather, the difficulties are built in. In ree-
ognition of these and related problems, the framerB and 
amenders of our constitution and our representatives 
in the legislature have wisely created a central adminis-
trative body and clothed it with broad quasi-legislative 
authority. It is significant that just about all disinterest-
ed property tax experts favor centralized, technically 
proficient state tax authority with considerable authority 
over local assessments and equalization.2 
POINT III 
THROUGHOUT THIS CONTROVERSY, 'rHE 
STATE TAX COMMISSION ACTED IN AC-
CORDANCE -WITH CONTROLLING LAW IN 
DISCHARGE OF ITS SUPERVISORY AND 
EQUALIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT 
THE PURPORTED ADJUSTMENTS MADE 
2See, for example, Morrill, Denis R., ProfH:rty Tax Asseessment and the 
Utah Constitution - A TaxPa)•er's Dilemma, in Utah Law Review (Vol. 1966 
- No. 2.) 
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BY THE COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZA-
TION ARE IN PART INVALID BECAUSE OF 
PROCEDURAL ERROR. 
Si11ce supervisory powers of the State Tax Commis-
sion over county tax officials have been set forth, it is 
uow appropriate to inquire as to whether or not these 
powers were properly exercised. The propriety of exer-
cise i11 relation to the actual reassessment in Provo and 
Orem was examined in some detail in respondent's ini-
tial brief, and such examination will not be repeated. We 
respectfully submit that the Commission's actions during 
the entire course of this reassessment were proper and 
wilhin its delegated powers. 
-,Ne shall at this juncture examine the actions of the 
county and state authorities in the hearings which fol-
lowed the appraisals and mailing of the notices of as-
Hessmen t. It is the position of respondent (set forth in 
Point V of the initial brief without commentary or argu-
ment) that the Commission's actions are sustainable, 
hut that those of the County Board of Equalization must 
be struck down in part because of procedural error and 
also because of abandonment of constitutional and statu-
tory valuation standards (discussed in Point IV infra). 
Section 59-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
( l~IG3), dealing with the powers and procedures of Coun-
ty Boards of Equalization, provides in pertinent part: 
The board of county commissioners is the county 
board of equalization and must meet on the 31st 
tlay of May in each year to examine the assess-
meut books and equalize the assessment of prop-
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erty in the county, including the assessment for 
general taxes of all cities and towns situateu 
therein. It must continue in session for the pur-
pose from time to time until the business of equal-
izing is disposed of, but not later than the 20th 
day of June, except as otherwise provided. All 
complaints regarding the assessment nf property 
'Where notice of the decision of the county hoanl 
of equalization thereon has not been gi\'ell to the 
taxpayer on or prior to June 20, and all such com-
plaints not disposed of or decided by sai(l board 
on or prior to said date shall be deemed to haw 
been denied on said date and no notice of such 
denial need be given. 
Section 59-5-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, setting 
forth a procedure for State Tax Commission reassess-
ments, provides: 
The state tax commission shall adjust and equal-
ize the valuation of the taxable property in the 
several counties of the state for the purpose of 
taxation; and to that end it may of its own ini-
tiative order or make an assessment or reassess-
ment of any property ·which it deems to have been 
overassessecl or underassessed or which it finds 
has not been assessed. In the event the commis-
sion shall intend to make an assessment or reas-
sessment under this section, notice thereof and of 
the time and place fixed by it for the determination 
of such assessment shall be given by the commis-
sion, by letter deposited in the post office at least 
fifteen days before the date so fixed, to the owner 
of such property and to the auditor of the county in 
which such property is situated. Upon the elate 
so fixed the state tax commission shall assess or 
reassess such property and shall notify the coun-
ty auditor of the assessment made, and every such 
assessment shall have the same force and effect as 
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if made by the county assessor before the deliv-
ery of the assessment book to the county treas-
urer. The county auditor shall record said assess-
ment upon the assessment books in the same man-
ner as is provided in section 59-7-9 in the case of a 
correction made by the county board of equaliza-
tion, and no county board of equalization or as-
sessor shall have any power to change any assess-
ment so fixed by the state tax commission. All 
hearings had upon assessments made or ordered 
by the state tax commission pursuant to this sec-
tion shall be held in the county in which the prop-
erty involved is situated. One or more members 
of the tax commission may conduct such hearing, 
and any assessment made after a hearing before 
any number of the members of the tax commis-
sion shall be as valid as if made after a hearing 
before the full commission. 
It is to be initially noted that the language in both of 
the controlling statutory provisions appears to be man-
datory, and nothing in their ·wording would suggest that 
one might be interpreted to be permissive and the other 
not. Nonetheless, this is exactly what happened in the 
lower court. Before this contradiction is further ex-
plorc<l, it would not be inappropriate to separately look 
at the impact on this problem of the two statutes, each in 
its own context. 
It is clear that the Utah County Board of Equaliza-
tion was asked to deal with a quantity of requests for 
equalization far beyond what it had dealt with in pre-
vious years, and perhaps beyond as well what it could 
adequately deal within the time provided in Section 
39-7-1 (although this not conceded). However, the solu-
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tion to this problem is in the law itself. The statute lim-
its the right of the board to function through the period 
between the 31st of .May and the 20th of .June each year 
''except as otherwise provided.'' This proviso refers to 
Section 59-5-46 ( 10), Utah Code Annotated, as amended 
(1959), which grants the Utah State Tax Commission dis-
cretion to reconvene county boards of equalization when-
ever necessary. The evidence shows that the county 
board did not request the Utah State Tax Commission 
to exercise its power pursuant to this provision, and that 
permission to reconvene was, therefore, not extended 
( R. 189). The record offers no reason to suspect thn t 
such a request would not have been honored, or indeed 
that comparable request by any county board had ever 
been denied. Therefore, any suggestions that the Com-
mission would have been arbitrary or capricious in the 
face of such a request must fail. 
The clear weight of authority in America is to the 
effect that a county board of equalization may function 
only within the time limits prescribed by the controlling 
language, and that these limits a.re jurisdictional. Sec 
New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Sussex County Board of Equali-
zation, 70 N.J.L. 186, 56 Atl. 138 (1903) ; State ex rel 
Evans v. McGiwnis, 34 Ind. 452, Anno. 105 A.L.R. 624 
(1936). 
Not only does the ruling of the lo-wer court fail to 
recognize that legislation in force explicitly provides a 
completely adequate remedy for the problem described, 
but it creates itself opportunity for com;iderable mis-
chief. The only limitation (and this is inferential) set 
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forth i11 the opm1on to the county commission's acting 
as a board of equalization after June 20 is a requirement 
that the board proceed with due diligence and reason-
able dispatch (R. 146), with the board apparently the 
judge of whether or not its diligence is due and its dis-
patch reasonable. The problems inherent in this type of 
situation are manifest. Suppose, hypothetically, that a 
buanl of equalization in a given county, acting under 
poor advice or a mistake in law or even (and this is con-
siderably less likely) bad faith would sit on an appeal or 
a group of appeals until so late in the season that it is 
prnctically impossible for the Commission to correct a 
pate11tly erroneous or discriminatory determination made 
l>y said board. If it is in the county board's power to 
determine its own dispatch and diligence, and to make its 
own evaluation as to whether attendant circumstances 
justify an extension of hearing beyond the statutory 
.June 20, this possibility is not remote. 
The ruling of the lower court in legitimatizing this 
kind of self-granted extension, based upon a board's own 
determination of its inability to complete its assigned 
task within the statutory period, with no provision for 
l'C·\-iew of that extension, seems to have no counterpart 
ill American jurisprudence. It seems patently at var-
innce with the principle of law limiting powers of coun-
ties and component agencies to those specifically spelled 
uut in statutory law, and Utah laws spelling out the su-
p2rvisory powers of the State Tax Commission. Fur-
!l1er, it seems to totally invalidate the third sentence of 
St•ction 59-7-1, supra, which states that all complaints 
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not disposed of on or prior to June 20 are deemed denied. 
This type of repeal of legislative acts by judicial fiat 
should not be upheld. 
Let us now examine briefly Section 39-5-47. The lower 
court has in effect held that this statute gives the state 
one day to hold a hearing, listen to the complaint, as-
semble all pertinent data, make ·whatever investigation 
it deems appropriate, make its determination, reduce 
that determination to writing, and serve the same upon 
the county auditor. It is concei;'able that the state's ma-
chinery might be able to do this in a single day in many 
instances by considering one or even a Yery few proper-
ties, but as the record shows in this case there were ap-
proximately 700 properties to consider in a very few 
days with pressures at least comparable to thosr 
earlier on the county board; to have complied with the 
procedure set forth aboYe would have perhaps taken 
months (which in itself would have been a denial of 
substantive justice). 
It would, of course, have been an easy matter for the 
state simply to have reestablished original values with-
out making any effort to investigate complaints, study 
material and data submitted, or attempt to be fair. 'I'hr 
Commission chose not to take this easy way out, hut 
rather made a bona fide effort toward equity and accuracy 
(Tr. 122-123), as evidenced by the fact that 39.4 per ee11t 
of the final assessments varied, howen•r slightly, from 
the initial assessments. 
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Rection 59-5-47 differs from Section 59-7-1 in two 
significant aspects: (1) because of the inherent powers 
of the sovereign state, it cannot be deemed jurisdictional; 
(2) it contains no built-in solution to time pressures 
which may arise, such as that relating to reconvening in 
the case of the county. 
There has been no contention, nor would the record 
support one, to the effect that the taxpayers involved 
here were in any way prejudiced by the few days involved 
in the Commission's investigation and consideration of 
the materials presented in the September hearings. On 
the contrary, the evidence suggests that this delay could 
only have ·worked to promote a proper and equitable re-
1·iew. We, therefore, respectfully suggest that a strict, 
unyielding construction of Section 59-5-47, based upon 
technical considerations extrinsic to its mis on d'etre is 
not appropriate, and that the statute should be liberally 
construed to implement its manifest purpose, which is to 
insure uniformity and equality of valuation, assessment 
and taxation. 
It seems totally arbitrary, and clearly opposed to 
the best interests of the state and its citizenry, to con-
strue Section 59-7-1, supra, which contains in itself an 
adequate solution to any problems involving time limita-
tions and pressures, liberally to allow the county board 
of equalization, which has 110 inherent authority, to in ef-
fect ignore many of its requirements, and at the same time 
to strictly construe Section 59-5-47, supra, when this 
statute contains no provisions for dealing with an ex-
t raonli11ary workload, against a sovereign state. 
25 
111 addition to the line of reasoning set forth above, 
defendant respectfully submits that, since it sent to the 
county auditor each day a notice of its action (i.e., that 
it took under advisement the valuation questions before 
it), that it did comply with the substance of Section 
59-5-47. 
In regard to the question of a supervisory officer sit-
ting as a hearing officer, \Ve submit that since the record 
shows that the official was a man of unusual knowledge 
ann background, a recognized expert in ad valorem taxa-
tion (Tr. 150-155 ), and since he acted merely as an ex-
tension of the Commission in listening to complaints and 
gathering information which he passed on to the Com-
mission, and further since he participated in no way in the 
Commission's ultimate decision-making process, it can-
not be responsibly maintained that those property hold-
ers who appeared before this supervisory officer were in 
any way prejudiced, or that they received either quan-
titatively or qualitatively any less consideration than 
other taxpayers. Again, the substance of the statute was 
complied with, and the lower court's ruling that these 
particular hearings are void, in the total context of the 
problem patently disregards the underlying purpose of 
the statutory language (59-5-47, supra) and, therefore, 
the decision should be reversed. 
Even though the procedure adopted by the state in 
its effort to correct the improper rulings of the Utah 
County Board of Equalization followed generally the 
procedures set forth in Section 59-5-47, supra, it should 
be noted (and this was urged to the lower court) that 
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they can be sustained under Section 59-5-46, supra, the 
pertinent parts of which are set forth in Point I, and Sec-
tion 59-7-13, supra. 
Since ~ 59-5-46 details the Commission's duties and 
responsibilities to supervise, advise, bring legal actions, 
etr., to insure "that all assessments of property be made 
just and equal, at true value, and that the tax burden 
may be distributed without favor or discrimination" 
(subsection 9) and then authorizes the Commission to 
"exercise all powers necessary in the performance of 
its duties" (suhseciton 23). We respectfully submit that 
the Commission's action was proper even in the absence 
of Section 59-5-47. There are no procedural problems 
here, since the law is clear that "where a statute em-
powers a state board to equalize valuations for taxation 
but does not point out the mode, any reasonable and 
efficient mode may be adopted.'' 3 Cooley, Law of Taxa-
tion~ 1196 (1924). See South Spring Rainge & Cattle Co. 
Y. Board of Equalization, 18 N.M. 531, 139 Pac. 159 
(1914). 
In relation to the procedure prescribed in Section 
39-7-13, we submit that the Commission made the requi-
site investigation and finding. Under the circumstances, 
an immediate raise to 20 per cent of fair cash value was 
as near to the 30 per cent standard as could justly be 
made. ·we respectfully submit that the Commission 
dearly met the requirements of this statute, which gives 
wide procedural latitude. 
vVe thus respectfully urge that even if the court finds 
the procedure requirements of Section 59-5-47 to be 
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absoluh•ly inflexible and further fim1s that the State Tnx 
Commission in its actions failed to adhere to these re-
quirements, that its corrective actions are sustainable 
under Seeton 59-5-47 and Section 59-7-13, or either of 
tltPm, and should be, therefore, upheld. 
POINT IV 
THI~ LOvVER COURT DID NOT ERR IN RUL-
ING THAT THE AGRICULTURAL CLASSI-
FICATION SYSTEM DEVISED AND IMPLE-
1\IENTED BY THE UTAH COUNTY BOARD 
OF EQUALIZATION -w AS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL, AND VALUATIONS ARRIVED AT 
B'/ USE OF THIS SYSTEM VOID. THE 
COURT SHOULD HAVE FURTHER RULED 
'l'HAT THE BOARD GENERALLY ABAN-
DONED IN ITS DELIBERATIONS THE CON-
STITUTIONAL STANDARDS OF UNIFORM 
AND EQTJAL ASSESSMENT, AND ASSESS-
MENT BASED ON FAIR MARKET VALUE, 
AND THAT THESE STANDARDS ARE 
BINDING UPON COUNTY AND STATE TAX 
OFFICIALS IN THE DIS CHARGE OF 
THEIR Y ARIOUS DUTIES. 
Tlw record shows that on July 10, 1968, the Utah 
County Board of Equalization adopted a resolution re-
lating to valuation of agricultural properties in this 
mam1(•r: 
''Commissioner Roberts movPd that the legiti-
mate Class I agricultural land in an agricultural 
zo11e be assessed at an appraised value of $500.00 
pcr acre with other lands i11 nn agricultural zone 
proratecl m·eording to class arnl also that agri-
eultural land not in a strictl~- agricultural zone 
lint nsed for legitimate farming he valued at 
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$650.00 per acre for Class I and with other lands 
prorated according to class, seconded by Commis-
sio11er Hinckley and passed unanimously.'' (R. 
131-132). 
The court held that this resolution was invalid, being 
violative of constitutional standards, since it does not 
purport to reflect market value, and that the adjusted 
valuations based upon this classification were void. We 
rc;,;pectfully suggest that the court was clearly correct in 
this ruling, but that it would have been appropriate to 
also rule that in its other deliberations as well the Board 
failed to adhere to controlling constitutional mandates. 
As pointed out in the intial brief of espondent, the 
Utah Constitution (art. XIII, ~ 2 and 3) requires a uni-
form and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and 
that all properties be assessed according to fair market 
or fair cash value. These two tests are complementary 
and interlocking, si11ce it is axiomatic that equality and 
uniformity in assessment and taxation can only be ob-
tained if a common standard is employed for all prop-
erties. 
The relief desired in this particular by respondent is 
a clear declaration that county tax officials, as well as 
state officials, are bound absolutely by the constitutional 
ancl statutory requirements of uniformity and equality 
of taxation and taxation based upon 30 per cent of fair 
cash value. Since this action is a declaratory judgment 
action, such a pronouncement by this honorable court 
would have no executory ramifications and would require 
no tax refunds, additional payments, recomputations or 
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other disrnpti,-e or time-consuming ads, but would lrnn 
a completely salutory impact upon future assessments 
and taxation procedures. All officials would be chargc<1 
with awareness and in fact aware that they have no op-
tion to deviate from constitutional requirements, or sub-
stitute at their pleasure other standards or considera-
tions for those set forth in controlling constitutional and 
statutory la\v. 
Appellants, in their brief, explore at length collat-
eral problems in relation to this agricultural classifica-
tion, pointing out the limited number of properties, the 
good faith of the Board, etc., and so on, but do not co11-
front the basic question, which is whether or not agricul-
t nrnl classification was permitted under the Constitution 
and statutes controlling at the time the controversy 
arose. It should be noted that these agricultural classi-
fications were made without regard to what the value of 
the land itself might be when utilized for purposes other 
than agriculture. Indeed, this is the very basis of the 
classification concept, that one does not consider fair 
market value, i.e., what a piece of land ·would bring in the 
open market, but merely considers what the property is 
worth used in a particular way. For example, if a clas-
sification law were passed holding that land used for 
grazing purposes in Utah would be Yalued at only $400 
an acre for ad valorem tax purposes, someone could con-
ceivahly purchase the land on which the Salt Palace is 
being huilt (zoning problems aside), convert it to pas-
tur0 for a large grey goat thPre kept tethered, and pay 
taxes on this prime realty, which would bring thousands 
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in the open market, on the basis of its classified value 
rather than its actual value. This illustration is admit-
tedly ad absurdum, hut it does point out the nature of the 
problem. 
Courts have uniformly held that where a consti-
iut ion requires uniform assessment and taxation accord-
ing to a given standard of value that classification is 
unconstitutional. For instance, in Real Foot Lake Levee 
District v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 36 S.W. 1041, 34 L.R.A. 
725 (1896) a plan to impose a simple tax of X dollars per 
aere on land was struck down because the true value re-
'luirement necessarily implies different tax on different 
lands since common sense suggests all would not have 
equal market value. In Atlantic & N. C.R. Co. v. Carta-
ret County Comm'rs, 75 N. C. 474 (1876) a law which 
provided that certain classes of property should not be 
valued for tax purposes below a specified sum was in-
\'alidated as violative of the market standard. Many oth-
er eases have simply held where constitution requires 
taxation of prnperty in proportion to its value neither the 
legislature nor administrative officials may divide prop-
<'rty into classes and place a specified value on each, 
whether or not such classifications are arbitrary or based 
upon a conscientious effort to determine average or me-
dian or typical values of properties. See, for example, 
Hawkins v. Mangam, 78 Miss. 97, 28 So. 872 (1900); 
T1i1 1ely v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., 102 Tex. 545, 120 S.W. 
'3;)2 (1909); Mahoney v. City of San Diego, 245 Pac. 189 
(Cal. 1926) ; Fruit growers Express Co. v. Brett, 94 Mont. 
281, 22 P.2d 171 (1933). 
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There is a Utah decision which conside1·ec1 the CJUCi-i-
tion of chu::sification of property for tax puqrnses. After 
recognizing the general rule that all presumptions must 
be exercised in favor of constitutionality of a statute, it 
still struck clown a classification statute as being repug-
nant to Utah Const. art. XIII, ~·~ 2 and 3. There is cur-
ious dicta in the case which suggests that classifica tio11 
per se might not be precluded in this jurisdiction so long 
as all classes are taxed at the same rate, but discrimi-
11ation is very purpose of classification. Stillrnan v. 
Lyuch, 56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272, 12 A.L.R. 552 (1920). 
More significant in this context even though older is 
State ex rel Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 
615 ( 1897). The court held: 
All taxable property within this state must be as-
sessed and taxed and valuation fixed at its actual 
cash value or as near such value as is reasonably 
prnctica1. 
There follows a fairly comprehensin listing of 
the cases dealing with the question of "Thether or not ag-
ricultural lands may be assessed at different rates than 
landR used for other purposes. Both Cooley and the 
American Law Report Annotations summary (111 
A.L.R. 1486) (1937) state that the better and general 
rnk is that Rtl<'h classification ,-iolates constitutional re-
(:nin•ments of uniform assessment "since such land may 
hP worth more than its value as agricultural land." 1 
Cooley, Law of Taxation ~ 158 (1924). Consistent with 
thiR rule an• the following: JJ1 onaglzan v. Lewis, 5 Pa. 218, 
::i9 At!. 948, JO )um. CaseR 1048 (190.J); Smith v. Ameri-
cus, 89 Gn. 810, 15 S.E. 752 (1892); Cary v. Rebrn, 88 
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111. 154, 30 Am. Rep. 543 (1878); Shuck v. Lebanon, 197 
Ky. 232, 53 S.W. 635 (1899); Opinion of Justices, 97 Me. 
:i~J7, 55 Atl. 827 (1903); Zanesville v. Richards, 59 Ohio 
St. 589 (1855); Saltonstall v. Board of Review of Cheboy-
.r;an, 1.'32 Mich. 196, 93 N.E. 154 (1903); Custer County v. 
8t. Louis S. F. Ry. Co., 207 P.2d 774 (Okla. 1949), (this 
case is unusual in that an attempt was made to dis-
criminate against rural properties); State Tax Comm'n 
v. JV akefield, 161 Atl. 2d 676 (Md. 1960); Boyne v. State, 
80 Nev. 160, 390 P.2d 225 (1964); Board of County 
('umm'rs of Canadian County v. State Board of Equali-
zation and eleven sister cases, 363 P.2d 242, et seq. (Okla. 
1964). 
The Maine and Nevada cases contain particularly 
interesting language. 
There is a line of Missouri cases, some before and 
some after a constitutional amendment. The later ones, 
with controlling constitutional language not dissimilar to 
our own, belong in the line above-quoted. See, for ex-
ample, Griswold v. O'Brien, 89 Mo. 631, 1 S.W. 763 
(1886). 
South Dakota also has a before-and-after line of 
cases. Prior to the constitutional amendment, when uni-
formity of assessment and taxation were required, the 
cases were consistent with those above listed. Simmons 
v. Erickson, 54 S.D. 429, 223 N.W. 324 (1929); Chicago 
R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Monaghan, 54 S.D. 432, 223 N.W. 
:344 (1929). After an ameudment which permitted clas-
Hification, a contrary result followed. See Great North-
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em R. R. Co. v. TYhitjield, 65 S.D. 173, 272 N:W. 781 
(1937). 
Iu Hamilton v. Fort TVayne, 40 Ind. 491 (1872), the 
philosophy of the above cases was recognized but a de-
fect in the statutory language in question necessitated 
a contrary decision. 
Cases permitting classification but doing so based 
upon permissive constitutional language at variance 
with our own include the following: Leicht v. Burlingto11, 
73 Iowa 29, 34 N.W.494 (1887); Daly v. Morgan, 60 Mrl. 
460, 1G Atl. 287, 1 L.R.A. 757 (1888); Dickinson "· 
Porter, 35 N.W.2d 66 (Okla. 1948) overruled prior de-
cision 31 N.W.2d 110); Switz Y. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 
182 Atl.2d 841 (1962). 
In State ex rel Lyman v. Stewart, 58 Mont. 1, 190 
Pac. 129 ( 1920) a tax was upheld which was laid solely 
upon agricultural properties. Considerations not here 
present were determinative. 
The antiquity of some of these cases illustrates the 
fact that this problem is, like the poor, ever with ns. 
In connection "·ith this problem, it should be noted 
that on N oyember 5th last preceding the electorate of 
this state amended the constitution to provide that agri-
cultural lands might be assessed according to a classi-
fied Yalue; i.e., the value of such lands would have as 
farm l::rnd:,;, rather than at their fair market value. A 
number of observations should be made in relation to 
this action of the electorate, the most obvious being that 
if it was necessary to pass a constitutional amendment to 
permit agricultural classification, then such classifica-
tion was not permissible prior to the time the amendment 
was passed. 
The contention might be made that the passage 
of this enactment rendered moot this point of the law-
suit. We would respectfully suggest that such conten-
tion must fail for the following reasons: 
(1) Whatever the law might become in the future, 
thr action arose when there was no basis for classifi-
cation in either constitutional or statutory law. 
( 2) The provision passed by the electorate is pennis-
sice and does not in itself change the law, but merely 
entitles the legislature to promulgate whatever law it 
sees fit. The legislature has not yet promulgated such 
a law. It is not certain what form of law it will pro-
mulgate, if any, and the situation is therefore like that 
found in Southern Pacific Co. v. Cochise County, 92 Ariz. 
305, 377 P.2d 770 (1963), where the constitution permit-
ted classification, but the legislature had not enacted im-
plementing legislation and therefore property classifica-
tion for purposes of assessment and taxation was not 
(and in Utah, at the time of this writing, is not) permis-
sible. 
(3) The constitutional amendment would permit the 
legislature of the state to classify agricultural properties 
for tax purposes, but nothing therein can be construed 
to give this power to county commissions. 
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( 4) Most significantly, the basic problem of classi-
fication, explicit or implicit, creating a variance from the 
constitutional standard of fair market value, remains 
with us. Even if the legislature does implement the 
agricultural classification amendment, the same prob-
lem could arise when state or local taxing authorities 
attempt to classify property on the basis of use in in-
dustry or mining, or ownership by widows or veterans, or 
any of a hundred of the conceivable grounds. 
Although the illegal agricultural classification at-
tempte<l by the Utah County Commission was a flagrant 
violation of the constitution and the inherent powers, it 
is only a single facet of the total abandonment by thesr 
officials of the constitutional directives in their equali-
zation proceedings. We would respectfully suggest that 
there is a total dearth of evidence in the record to sup-
port the court's finding (R. 189) that the County Boanl 
attempted to adhere to the requirements of the consti-
tution or that it based its deliberations on sales data 
or other relevant information. 
-While the record is clear that the Utah County 
Board of Equalization completely abandoned the con-
stitutional fair market Yalue, it is not clear as to what 
standards were adopted. It would seem that the Board 
iiroc0eckd in an irregular aml unsystematic manner, 
relying on all manner of extralegal aml extra technical 
factors, such as pre-existing valuations of a decade's 
vintage and the personalities and economic situations of 
those appearing before it. The degree of the Board's 
rleparture from a11y realistic attempt at 'rnluation i:-; 
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illustrated vividly by reference to Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 4. This exhibit shows the original values arrived 
;it hy the state appraisal teams, and their subsequent fate. 
A simple computation from this exhibit reveals the 
following: In relation to 328 of the 716 parcels about 
which full information is available in the exhibit, or in 
15.8 per cent of the cases, the county board reduced 
the assessment to less than half of that determined by 
appraisal, in most of these instances to substantially less 
tha11 half, and in some cases ( ex.-E-384-A, E-497-1, 
E-587-D, E-739, E-750-1-1, F-468, F-1495-18-A, G-647, 
G-1408, G-2107) the reduction was over 80 per cent. In 
116 instances, or 16.2 per cent of the total, the board 
simply halved to the nearest dollar the assessment be-
fore it, and in 63 additional instances, or 8.8 per cent of 
the total, dropped the assessment to slightly above half 
of the original. In only 209 cases, or 29.2 per cent of 
tlw parcels, was the board's adjusted valuation less ex-
treme, and in most of these instances it represented re-
ductions of 20 - 30 per cent of the original assessment. 3 
\Vhile we submit that there is more than sufficient 
admitted evidence in the record to show that abandon-
ment and deviation by the County Board, the proffered 
testimony of Augustus B. C .. Johns, Jr., a recognized 
expert in the appraisal field (Tr. 272-273) should remove 
the last vestige of doubt. 
3 To cite just one particularly telling s~eci~c e.xample of t~e criteri.a 
Jnd processes utilized bv the Board of Equahzat10n 1s the Boards determ1-
n.ttion that assessed vai"uation or the land of the Riverside Country Club 
was j;J 00 per acre I (Pl. Exh. 8, p. 54-55) 
37 
Prior to 1\Ir. J olms' proffered testimony, another 
proffer was made (after the court refused to admit tes-
timony as actual evidence). Commissioner G. Mario11 
Hinckll'y, oue of the plaintiffs, testified in this proffer 
that pursuant to agreement with Governor Calvin L. 
Rampton he and his fell ow commissioners selected cer-
tain properties among the subject properties of this ac-
tion for an independent appraisal to determine whether 
or not the appraisal conducted by the Utah State Tax 
Commission was accurate. Mr. Hinckley further testified 
that they selected not average properties but properties 
which he and his fellow commissioners thought were par-
ticnlarly out of line. ( Tr. 271) Pursuant to this agree-
ment, ::\Ir. Johns was retained by the Governor. 
1\f r. Johns' proffer shows that his testimony would 
have been that his independent appraisal of these prop-
erties, conducted according to expert methods, and with-
out knowledge of the valuations placed upon these prop-
erties by either the state or the county, resulted in value 
determinations strikingly close to those of the state, well 
within the degree of variance usually found in the pro-
fession, and way out of line with, and sometimes even 
a multiple of, the valuation figures finally adopted by the 
county. Appraisal is not an exact thing, and some var-
iance is always present, but competent appraisers will 
rn ry little (usually within 5 per cent) of their final con-
clusions. 
~Ir. J olms would have also testified, based upon his 
personal knowledge of the real estate market in the area 
and direct investigation of over one hundred parcels pur-
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suant to his employment by the Governor, that in recent 
yt>ars Orem and Provo property values on the type of 
land valued by the county pursuant to classification at 
$SOO and $650 per acre have been fairly level as here 
indicated: 
Area Price Per Acre Range 
Northeast Provo ________________ $5,000 to $6,000 
Orem (General) ------------------ $2,000 to $3,000 
Orem (West Side)-------------- $1,200 to $3,000 
He would have testified further in relation to particular 
properties, the most interesting of which was located im-
mediately adjacent to the golf course, valued by the Board 
at $500 per acre. His testimony would have shown that 
in .May of last year a purchase was made by a Warren 
J\I urphy of fifteen acres of such land at an average price 
of $5,300 per acre. 
Mr. Johns would have additionally testified that, in 
!tis opinion, it would not have been possible for the 
valuations placed by the county upon the golf course and 
the other properties he examined, to be arrived at 
through the use of any accepted appraisal techniques or 
procedures. He would have testified similarly that the 
$500-$650 value range placed upon agricultural lands 
through the classification bears no relationship and has 
no reference whatsoever to the actual values of the lands 
COl1CPrned. 
The entirety of }fr. Johns' proffer (Tr. 280-288) is 
1wommended to the court for its perusal. These state-
ments assume additional weight when considered in the 
frame of reference of his exceptional background, ex-
perience, and qualifications, which were summarized by 
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him to the proffer, and his reputatiou among his peers, 
whirh is equally imposing. 
\Ve respectfully suggest that the court erred in ex-
eln<liug this testimony and that it ·was obviously proba-
tive, particularly when the whole chronology in the mat-
ter is considered. The trial court expressed concern when 
making its exclusion that allo\ving Mr. J olms to tes-
tify might lead to a "parade of experts" coming to the 
stand with confusing and co11tradictory testimony. \Ye 
would respectfully submit that it would not have been 
possible, for obvious reasons, for plaintiffs to secnre an 
expert witness with anything resembling l\Ir. J oh11s' 
stature, to def end the County Board's figures as tending 
to reflcet market value. These figures are so far out of 
line with th0 actual market values that no reputable 
appraiser would have supported the Board's actions if 
he had rpgarcl for his professional reputation. If the 
plaintiff did perchance offer a rebutting expert, the court 
could easily han weighed the testimony of both. 
\Ve respectfully suggest that much of the testimony 
of l\Tr. Johns merely affirms and underscores evidence 
otht•rwise in the rerord, and some of it is of so obviously 
t rne and g0n0rall>· accepted as true, that the court cou]cl 
well take> judicial notice of it. ·while we believe that 
the lmver court clearly erred in excluding this testi-
mo11y and that this court should consider the same i11 its 
final dPtcrmi11ation, it is not the desire of any of the par-
ties 1 hat the case lw rcrnnnclecl for additional evidence, 
i11 Yit'\\' of the aente time pressures mid the public sig--
ll ifiea ll('e of Ow e011 tro\·ersy. \Ye would suggest that 
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pn11 without Mr. Johns' tesfonony the record clearly 
supports respondent's contentions that the County Board 
of gqualization did abandon the constitutional and statu-
tory test of equal and uniform valuation according to fair 
market value, both generally and specific-ally (in its 
a<1option of an agricultural elassification), and that the 
conrt can so find from the record as it now exists. 
Appellants dwell at length on the fact that the Coun-
ty Board of Equalization exercised its powers in 700 of 
the 1,200 cases that it considered and refused to grant 
any relief in the other 500. An examination of the 
county minutes, however, "'ill show that in many in-
stances when the county refused to grant requested ad-
justments, the requests involved buildings or lands not 
part of those which were recently revalued in connection 
with the state's appraisal program, and that the County 
Board typically granted relief, usually (as will be pointed 
out below) extensiYe relief, when petitioned in relation 
to land in Proyo and Orem. In fact, the record clearly 
c•vidences total abandonment in most instances by the 
Board of the constitutional and statutory standards of 
fair market value when dealing with this land. 
The description on Pages 23 and 24 of appellants' 
bri<•f of the concern about the agricultural classifica-
tion and similar problems as "diversionary tactics 
rnneeived after the fact'' is completely without merit. 
Indeed, the record clearly shows that these deviations 
we>re the sine qua non of the entire action - but for these 
d0,·iations there would have been no request for coopera-
tion and restoration of the original values, no interven-
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tion, no lawsuit. We also suggest that careful cxamina 
tion of the pleadings, pretrial order and the remaining 
parts of the record will show that these issues were pro1i-
C'rly before the lower court and are properly before thi~ 
court 011 appeal. 
Also lacking in merit is the inference that the fact 
that State Tax Commission personnel sat with the Comt-
ty Board of Equalization during the 1967 hearings some-
how sanctions the Board's actions. The record clearly 
shows (Tr. 204-205) that these personnel were instructed 
only to offer technical assistance and to attempt no snli-
staiit i w intervention into the Board's deliberations. Cmt-
troversy arose soon after these hearings, indeed during 
the latter part of them, and the suggestion that these per-
sormel "did not communicate ... to the Commissioners" ' 
... their "feeling of impropriety" is note"worthy to say 
the least. 
·we respectfully further suggest that the argument 
a<lvanced in the first full paragraph on Page 25 of ap-
pellants' brief is not only of questionable merit but actual-
ly harmful to appellants' position. If the lower cou1i can-
not dcclar<:> void in this type of an action assessment~ 
hased upon an illegal agricultural classification, it then 
follows a fort£ori that the court cannot declare void, as 
it did at the instigation and urging of appellants, 16,300 
assessments which had been accepted and acquiesced i11 
hy all affect<:>d parties (stat<:> officials, local officials and 
taxpayPrs) and which were the basis of the actual taxes, 
Hever protested, paid during the year 1967 on these prop-
<'rties. 'I'his argument is a Pandora's hox, which "-c 
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anticipated appellants would avoid like a contagious dis-
Pase, since it is totally inconsistent with their contention 
in relation to the reappraisals. It appears to be tan-
g<>nial to the central issues of the cases, and of dubious 
rnliclity, hut we liave no objection to the court's consid-
(•ration of it, since such consideration can only work to 
t lw ]Jeuefit of respondent. 
Counsel for appellants emphasized in his argument 
before the lower court, and again in his brief before this 
l10norable court, the good intentions and miscellaneous 
bona fides of the County Board of Equalization. Respond-
l'llt has not addressed itself extensively, either below 
or before this court, to these intentions, feeling that 
,,,Jiether or not the County Board acted in good faith is 
uot really relevant. If it used wrong valuation stand-
ards and made illegal adjustments in good faith, the 
stn te 's right to correct these errors is just as solidly 
present as it would be had the abandonment of the con-
stitutional standard and erroneous adjustments resulted 
from bad advice, gross negligence or even deliberate 
maliciousness. As stated in a leading Arizona case: 
There is no indication of any dishonest motives 
on the part of any of these officials. We are sat-
isfied there were none but if the result of these 
intentional acts is discrimination the assessments 
cannot stand irrespective of motives. Sparks v. 
McCluskey, 84 Ariz. 283, 327 P.2d 295 (1958). 
It should be noted, that even though respondent has 
not ehallenged (and does not now formally challenge) 
lhe good faith of appellants, such good faith is not all 
that obvious from the record. The lack of cooperation 
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Pvid<•11cc•d h>· appellants from the lwgi1ming; the incrPcli-
ble dcYiati011 from the \'aluations arrin~d at by state ap-
praisers using the most current a rnl generally accepted 
appraisal teelmiques; the nrnh to get the ,-aluations bat-wd 
11po11 the county adjustments out; the refusal of appel-
lants to cooperate with or accommodate the Commission 
in a11>- way in its efforts to work out an interim solution 
io the problem which '''onld make possible the ultimate 
collectio11 of whatever tax was finally determined to ht> 
appropriate (such collection now being unfeasible 110 
matter who wins); the making of certain representations 
at the hearing before this court on a motion for extraor-
cli11ary relief at the outset of the litigation; and the chn•ll-
ing on arguments about pressures of time and spacr• 
1l'li icli arose aft er the inception of tli e cont racers y ( 1-:ec 
appellants' ]Jrief, pp. 20-21), suggest that the appellants' 
primary intc•re;;;t during the time immediately preceding 
and follo-wi11g the filing of this action was not to work 
out the problem in the best interests of all concerned in 
an open and cooperative manner, but rather to colled 
taxes based upon their own Yaluations in such a way as 
to make most difficult any recouping of aclcli tional monie.~ 
slwuhl the ultimate issue be resolved in the state's fayor. 
Illustrative of this attitrnle is the frivolous testimou:r 
of the Utah County Auditor (Tr. 4G) to the effect that 
only t\\-o persous could work on the assc>ssment roll hooks 
at a time, when the physical eYiclence (Plaintiffs' Exh. 
!l) pr0se11terl sho\\-s that the pages of this book are of a 
looselen f na tun• an cl could be remoYecl at "·ill. \V <' will 
extend this diseussion no fnrtlwr, ho\Yever, because the 
good faith or lack thereof of a11~- of the appellants or, in 
ileed of any persons herein inYolved, is not of cardinal 
~igHificance. What is important is whether or not ac-
tioJJs taken ·were consiste11t with constitutional a11d stat-
utory standards, and whether such actions represented 
propPr exercises of delegated powers. Plaintiffs' posture 
of wounded innocence does seem, however, somewhat in-
enng ruous. 
The power of the State Tax Commission to correct 
rnluations within a county determined by it to be e1To-
11cous is clear (see Point I) and not depernlent upon 
hatl faith, gross deviation from the norm, requests for 
a<ljustment, or any other extraneous circumstances. 
'We therefore urge this honorable court to: 
( 1) Affirm the decision of the lower court in relation 
to the agricultural classification system; 
(2) Specifically rule that county, as well as state, 
l)ffir:ials are bound by the constitutional standards of uni-
form and equal assessment and taxation and assessment 
according to fair market value in exercising assessment 
aJtd equalization powers, and that the Utah County Board 
of gqualization in 1967 deviated from these standards. 
POINT V 
TH:BJ SOLUTION PROPOSED BY APPEL-
LANTS DOES NOT SOLVE, NOR DOES THE 
OFFERED DISPOSITION DISPOSE OF, THE 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF ASSESS-
MENT INEQUALITY, AND SHOULD BE RE-
JECTED IN FAVOR OF A BROADER, MORE 
R:B~ASONABLE RESOLUTION WHICH IS 
CONSISTENT vVITH CONTROLLING LAW 
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J.ND \VHICH WOULD LAY THE BASIC 
PROBLE"'.\1 TO REST BY -WORKING EQUITY 
THROUGHOUT THE STATE. 
If there is one aspect of this case about which all 
parties are in agreement, it is that there is at the present 
time considerable inequity in ad valorem taxation in 
the state of Utah. Disparity exists within classes of 
property, between classes of property and between dif-
ferent parts of the state geographically. In general, 
taxes are highest on personality and utility properties 
and lowest on rural agricultural realty. It is apparent 
that action needs to be taken to eliminate, in the inter-
ests of equality and adherence to law, these discrepan-
cies. The only viable program in the state which is work-
ing toward solution of these problems, that of the Utah ' 
State Tax Commission, was dealt a serious blow in the 
lower court when the cyclical reappraisal program con-
ducted pursuant to Section 59-5-46.1, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, was found (erroneously, we respectfully sug-
gest) defective in implementation and valuations made 
thereunder voided. 
Appellants urge upholding of this ruling, but offer no 
meaningful program of their own to solve the Utah Coun-
ty problem. The inference is that the inequality should 
lie allowed to exist indefinitely, and indeed worsen, until 
some unspecified time in the great blue beyond when the 
Commission is able to offer a "plan" meeting certain 
imidentifiPd criteria which would soh'e the problem, prcf-
urnbly c·orn·eJ1trati11g elsewhere than in Utah County. 
']'his is no solution at all; if adopted, the perpetuation of 
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1·xi8ting problems will be assured. Some residents are 
shouldering substantially more than their share of the 
lrnnle11, and there is little to be said for continuing this 
condition any longer than necessary. Further, there are 
~Hlclitional lawsuits already filed, as pointed out in re-
spo11dent 's initial brief, and if the basic problem is not 
now solved a multiplicity of litigation is more than a re-
mote possibility. We would respectfully suggest, for the 
reasons set forth in the initial brief, that the part of the 
lo\\'l'r court's decree voiding the appraisal program and 
rnluations arrived at thereunder be reversed, or, in the 
alternative, that this court by its edict require state-wide 
uniformity within a given time (see Point IV, initial 
l1ricf). 
This last approach appears particularly attractive 
\\'hen the alternatives are considered: 
(1) Sustaining the lower court's ruling as to the 
inYalidity of the assessments in question, which could 
only make a bad situation worse by destroying the only 
(dfoetive program now working towards uniformity and 
equality, and giving local officials a carte blanche to ig-
nore the controlling law and continue to engage in which 
.:'llr. Morrill referred to as "competitive undervalua-
tion'' ;4 and 
(2) Simply reversing the lower court's declaration 
in i11validity, which would allow the State Tax Commis-
sion to proceed with due diligence in its systematic state-
wide reassessment program. The effectiveness of this 
4 Monill, Denis R,, Property Tax Assessment and the Utah Constitution 
~- A Taxpaver's Dilemma, supra, 
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remetly would depend to a great deal on the legislatm1· 
making sufficient funds available to permit an effoctin 
attack on the problem (there is considerable grounds for 
optimism here) and upon the effecti,-e, cooperative effort 
of lo<'al officials (there is less cause for encouragement iu 
this particular, because of the limitatio11s in monies and 
teclrnirally trained personnel in the eounties - particu-
larly the smaller ones - and because of pressures to keep 
assessments down). 
CONCLUSIOX 
Dl'foudant is painfully cognizant that the court is 
being presented with a rather large bundle for its con-
sideration. The record is long and somewhat cluttered, 
the briefs extensin, the issues complex. \Ve are equally 
cognizant, however, that these issues are of the highest 
public importance, and are reluctant to jeopardize their 
full and thorough consideration through a mechanical 
effort to shorten the record or simply the argument. WP 
have, ho·wev0r, maue an effort to focus the attention of 
the court on the most significant problems here presented. 
The difficulties connected with the case are further 
compounded hy the difference in emphasis placed upon 
the facts (in relation to which there is nry little basic 
disagreement) by respeetin counsel since the iuitiatiou 
of the lawsuit. 
\Ye submit that controlli11g law clearly provides that 
the State Tax Commission has supen-isory power ovrr 
county officials in all valuatiou, asscssmeut and taxatiou 
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fuuctions, including the power to adjust assessments 
1Cif hin a county; that county boards of equalization are 
hnmtd in their deliberations by constitutional and statu-
ton' standards of fair cash value and uniformity and 
<'q nality of taxation, and may not classify properties in an 
effort to defeat these standards; that the Utah County 
Board of Equalization in its 1967 sittings deviated in a 
large degree from these standards and from the pro-
cedural requirements set forth in Section 59-7-1; that 
the Commission, in its subsequent reassessments acted 
in accorua11ce with law; that those statutes which de-
fine the Commission's powers and set forth the proced-
ures for exercising this power should be liberally inter-
preted to effectuate the legislative intent of insuring just, 
fair and uniform taxation; that the systematic statewide 
n~assessment program of the Commission, working to-
ward uniformity and equality, should be sustained and 
''alnations arrived at through this program validated 
aml upheld or, in the alternative, that this honorable 
court should order uniform compliance throughout the 
s1 ate with the constitutional and statutory provisions 
prescribing uniform and equal taxation of all proper-
ties based upon fair cash value. The lower court recog-
nized many of these propositions; insofar, however, as 
it8 decision deviated therefrom, ·we respectfully submit 
1 lint its ruling should be modified. 
rrhis case can, and we respectfully submit should, 
li1• considered from two vantage points: 
( l) As a specific controversy which arose in 1967 be-
h1er11 two levels of government; 
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(2) As a problem of widespread assessment inequal-
1 
ity, of grc>at magnitude and duration, of which the pre-
cipitating controversy is only a small part. 
We realize that a case in which an appellate conrt 
properly looks beyond the specific parties involved, and ' 
the transactions between them, in its deliberations i~ 
somewhat out of the ordinary. This is, howeYer, such a 
case. We respectfully urge this honorable court to exer-
cise its powers to effect a full and meaningful solution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
l\I. REED HUNTER 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
